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Abstract
The article critically analyses the role of the Nigerian courts in mediating resultant tensions in
the post-authoritarian transition period. In doing this, I examine jurisprudence emanating from the
courts on some serious inter-governmental disputes, as well as decisions bordering on individual
and group rights, particularly those connected to the transition process. The dynamics of demo-
cratic transition in Nigeria after decades of military rule dictates the inevitability of these disputes.
The military left a legacy of systemic distortion and institutional dysfunctions which constitute
formidable challenges to the transitioning society. The article argues a case for a purposive ju-
risprudential approach to resolving the ensuing tensions which typically threaten the viability of
the transition.
KEYWORDS: transitional justice, judiciary, constitutionalism, human rights
∗Hakeem O. Yusuf: Barrister (Nigeria). Tutor and PhD Candidate, School of Law, University of
Glasgow. I am grateful to Scott Veitch for his comments on an earlier draft of this article. The
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this article, I critically analyse the role of the Nigerian courts in mediating 
tensions that have emerged in the post-authoritarian transition period. In doing 
this, I examine jurisprudence emanating from the courts on some serious inter-
governmental disputes as well as decisions that touch upon individual and 
collective rights particularly connected to the transition process. The dynamics of 
democratic transition in Nigeria after decades of military rule, dictate the 
inevitability of these disputes. The military left a legacy of institutional distortion 
and dysfunctions the result of which is a series of ongoing and formidable 
challenges to the transitioning society. The societal distortions and dysfunctions 
extend beyond the economic, social and political sectors to the constitutional and 
legal order. This is due in part to the nature of military rule with its legendary 
disregard for the rule of law, constitutionalism and due process.  
The Nigerian experience is complicated by the predilection of military 
rulers for a unified command-structure approach to governance in a 
heterogeneous society. Rhetorically, successive military governments1 paid lip-
service to the preservation of the federal character of the country but in practice, 
the command-structured governance that characterised military rule saddled the 
country with a caricature federation. Analysts have noted that such unification or 
‘high degree of uniformity in the nature of political arrangements’ is second 
nature to authoritarianism.2  
The military legacy has predictably generated (and continues to generate) 
considerable tension between the central government on the one hand and the 
(federating) states on the other. Such a tension has brought about critical 
consequences for constitutionalism and the rule of law in Nigeria. In particular, 
the legislature and largely, the judiciary have been tasked with resolving the 
executive impasse that has been the fall-out of these tensions in the transition 
period. However, despite the growing importance of the judicial function in 
transitioning polities, scant attention has been paid to judicial activity in Africa in 
general.3 There is thus reason to critically evaluate the state of judicial 
                                                 
1 That is with the notable exception of the short-lived regime of Major-General John Thomas 
Aguiyi-Ironsi from January-July 1966 that pioneered military incursion into governance in 
Nigeria. He abolished the regions and the federal structure of the country. His unification policy 
was one of the major causes of the rebellion by officers from the Northern part of the country, a 
bloody coup leading to his death and Nigeria’s 4-year civil war. See Ojo, Abiola. “The Search for 
a Grundnorm in Nigeria: The Lakanmi Case” The International Comparative Law Quarterly 20 (1) 
(1971) 117-136. 
2 Ni Aolain, Fionnula and Campbell Colm “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies” 
Human Rights Quarterly 27 (2005): 172, 182. 
3 Prempeh, H Kwasi. “African Judges in their Own Cause: Reconstituting Independent Courts in 
Contemporary Africa” International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (3) (2006): 592-593. 
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government in Nigeria in view of recent socio-political developments in the 
period of transition to civil rule in the country. 
The discussion in this article is set against the backdrop of several 
complexities. These include unresolved issues of transitional justice and 
reparations for victims of gross abuses of human rights from decades of military 
authoritarian rule4 and concerns regarding the alarming levels of insecurity in the 
Niger Delta (source of oil, the mainstay of the country’s economy).5 Other 
prevailing contemporaneous debacles are the control of the political and economic 
sectors of the country by erstwhile military rulers (or their acolytes). There is also 
the issue of continued violations of human rights in the post-authoritarian period 
by a democratic government, growing poverty (associated with IMF/WB 
economic structural adjustment programmes),6 electoral manipulation and 
violence, etc. Thus framing issues around constitutionalism, human rights and the 
critical nature of the role of the judiciary in contemporary Nigerian society 
indicates there is indeed an onerous responsibility on the judicial function. How 
the judiciary has played, its role can be gleaned from the jurisprudence emanating 
from decisions relating to these and sundry issues.  
I will conduct the analyses within two politically significant period-
frames; the transition to civil from authoritarian rule (1999-2003) and the ‘civil-
civil’ transition (2003-2007) in the country. I have framed the periodization in the 
hope that it would assist in presenting a constructive template for critical 
evaluation of the fallouts of the identified accountability gap7 in the role of 
judicial governance in the country. The adopted framework is consistent with 
transitional justice theory. Transitional justice analyses recognise that while it is 
possible to identify a single ‘transitional moment’8 identified in ‘paradigmatic 
transitions,’9 a number of transitions (or transition milestones) may in fact be 
discernible within the process of political change.10 In the context of the Nigerian 
transition, I argue in what follows that there are discernibly distinct strands in 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of the stalemate that attended the truth-telling process in the aftermath of the 
transfer of power in the democratic transition process in Nigeria see Yusuf, Hakeem O. “Travails 
of Truth: Achieving Justice for Victims of Impunity in Nigeria” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 1 (2)  (2007): 268-286. 
5 For a recent dispassionate elucidation of the crisis in the Niger Delta see International Crisis 
Group. “Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest” (2006) Africa Report No.115 
6 See generally, Okafor, Obiora C. “The Precarious Place of Labour Rights and Movements in 
Nigeria’s Dual Transition, 1999-2005” Journal of African Law 51 (2007):68-94. 
7 Yusuf note 4 supra. 
8 Ni Aolain and Campbell note 2 supra at 181. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. at 183 (‘...we argue for the need to conceive of transitional situations not as involving one 
single transition, but in terms of at least two primary sets…This is not to suggest that there may 
not be other co-terminus primary transitions occurring’).  
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judicial governance that can be evaluated through the prisms of the ‘transitions-
within-a transition’ experience of the country. 
The judiciary has recently been the focus of both national and international 
attention as a context that offers hope for the resolution of ongoing disputes and 
contestations in the public arena. Has the judiciary been instrumental to furthering 
or impeding the transition to democratic rule, respect for human rights and 
upholding the rule of law? What has been the nature of judicial intervention in 
ongoing tensions that emerge from the interplay of a centrifugal federalism and 
dynamics of political transition in a heterogeneous, resource-rich but 
impoverished polity? These questions constitute the foci of this article.  
 
2. BACKWARDS WITH PLAIN-FACT JURISPRUDENCE: THE 
OPUTA PANEL CASE 
 
Barak contends that the role of the Supreme Court in democratic governance is 
‘corrective.’ In the discharge of this corrective function, the judiciary is expected 
to bridge ‘the gap between law and society as well protect democracy in 
cooperation with the other branches of government.’11 If we agree with Barak on 
the primary duty of a supreme court, it can be argued that the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria fell short of this role in its decision in Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.), 
Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission and Gani Fawehinmi v 
General Ibrahim Babangida, Brigadier Halilu Akilu and Brigadier Kunle Togun 
(the Oputa Panel Case). 12 In view of the resounding impact of the case on 
Nigeria’s choice of transitional justice mechanism and the analyses proposed on 
the judicial role in transitional contexts below, it is germane to set out the facts of 
the case in some detail. 
 
The Facts, the Decision.  
 
On the heels of the country’s political transition to democracy after 
decades of military authoritarianism, then newly elected President Olusegun 
Obasanjo issued Statutory Instrument No. 8 of 1999 (later amended by Statutory 
Instrument No. 13 of 1999) to constitute a Judicial Commission of Inquiry for the 
investigation of human rights violations in Nigeria between 1st January 1984 and 
                                                 
11 Barak, Aharon. “Foreword-A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy” 
Harvard Law Review 116 (1) (2003): 19, 28. 
12 [2003] M.J.S.C 63. This is the report of the defendants’ appeal to the Supreme Court following 
the victory of ‘the Generals’ at the Court of Appeal. Reference will however be made in a 
composite manner to the matter through the court of first instance (Federal High Court) through to 
the Supreme Court. Reference to ‘Courts’ in the following context will cover all three courts 
except as specifically stated. 
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28 May 1999. The instrument President made pursuant to his powers under 
Section 1 of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act (TIA).13 Formally styled the Human 
Rights Violations Investigations Commission (HRVIC, the Commission), it 
became popularly known as the Oputa Panel, earning that sobriquet from the 
name of the respected retired Supreme Court justice who headed it.14  
In the course of the inquiry, the Commission issued summonses on the 
Respondents/Plaintiffs (Respondents) to appear and testify before it in response to 
a petition on the murder of Dele Giwa. The prominent Lagos-based journalist was 
killed by a letter bomb (the first in the country’s history) believed to have been 
delivered to him by state security agencies under the aegis of the 2nd and 3rd 
Respondents. They are widely believed to have acted on the instructions of the 1st 
Respondent, then military head of state. The Respondents were not willing to 
appear before the Panel. To frustrate the summons, they instituted two separate 
suits before the Federal High Court against the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Defendants 
(Appellants) to challenge the powers of the Commission to compel their 
attendance at the Commission’s public sittings. The 3rd Appellant, counsel to the 
slain journalist joined the suit on his application as an interested party.  
The Respondents claimed inter alia that it was unlawful for the 1st and 
2nd Appellants to summon them to appear to testify or produce documents at the 
Commission’s public hearings. They prayed the court for an order prohibiting the 
1st and 2nd Appellants from compelling them to attend the public hearings to 
answer questions or produce documents. The grounds of the application, amongst 
others, were that the TIA under which the Oputa Panel was established is not an 
existing law within the meaning of section 315 of the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 315 makes provisions for savings and 
modification provisions for existing laws in the country. The Respondents further 
sought a declaration that the compulsive powers granted the Commission under 
the TIA are in breach of fundamental rights guaranteed by sections 35 and 36 of 
the Constitution. Section 35 of the Constitution provides for the right to liberty 
while section 36 concerns the right to fair hearing. With the concurrence of the 
parties, the Federal High Court, a superior court of record of first instance, 
referred constitutional issues arising from the case for determination by the Court 
of Appeal.  
 On 31st October 2001, precisely ten days before the close of public 
hearings by the Oputa Panel, the Court of Appeal ruled on the issues. The Court 
of Appeal declared the ‘compulsive’ powers of the 2nd Appellant unconstitutional 
and in violation of the Respondents fundamental rights contained in sections 35 
and 36 of the constitution. Dissatisfied with the decision, the Appellants appealed 
                                                 
13 No. 447, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.   
14 Yusuf note 4 supra. 
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to the Supreme Court and this enabled the Panel to proceed with the public 
hearings. The Respondents also cross- appealed. 
The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal of Inquiry Act was existing law 
under section 315 of the 1999 Constitution. It also however held that the 
Constitution does not confer powers on the National Assembly to enact a general 
law on tribunals of inquiry for the whole country. This was because neither the 
Exclusive nor the Concurrent Legislative lists in the Constitution include tribunals 
of inquiry as a legislative item, unlike the 1963 Constitution, that listed tribunals 
of inquiry as a specific item in the Exclusive Legislative List. The Court also held 
that tribunals of inquiry fall within the residual powers of both the National 
Assembly (for the Federal Capital Territory) and State Houses of Assembly for 
the respective States. The Tribunal of Inquiry Act of 1966 under which the Oputa 
Panel was established therefore took effect under the 1999 Constitution as an Act 
of the National Assembly for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja only. In 
essence, the president had exceeded his jurisdiction in establishing the Oputa 
Panel with a remit to carry out a national inquiry into the violations of human 
rights in all parts of the country.  
 
Between Executive Failure and Judicial Complacency 
 
The Oputa Panel Case eloquently presents two of a number of unsettling 
features in the legal and statutory framework of governance in Nigeria’s political 
transition. First, is the extensive reliance by all branches of government on 
autocratic legislation deriving from the colonial past and authoritarian military 
regimes. Second, is a customary, uncritical judicial adherence to precedent. 
Deriving from the first feature, an elected democratic transition government 
placed reliance on the TIA, a pre-republican legislation to set up a truth 
commission by executive fiat at a time it had become standard practice to do so 
under purpose-specific legislation.15 Proceeding on the second feature, the 
judiciary on its part relied extensively on the case of Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa & Others v Doherty &Others16 in which the then Federal Supreme Court 
and the Privy Council had both upheld objections to the compulsive powers and 
the jurisdictional reach of the TIA. Without delving into the contentious value of 
judicial precedents particularly in the common law legal tradition, it is important 
to make the point that the post-republican Nigerian Supreme Court is not in fact 
                                                 
15 Thus, the South Africa and Ghana truth commissions that in temporality closely preceded and 
succeeded the Nigerian truth-telling process respectively were set up pursuant to tailor-made 
legislation. For a fairly comprehensive and representative discussion of the establishment and 
conduct of truth-telling processes in different parts of the world, see Hayner, Priscilla B. 
Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. (New York: Routledge 2001).  
16(1963) 1 WLR 949 
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or law by the decisions of both authorities. This is because the Federal Supreme 
Court was not the highest court for Nigeria at the time since as in this case, final 
appeals still lied to the Privy Council in London. The subsequent republican status 
of the country saw to the end of precisely that. 
The Obasanjo administration relied on shaky legal foundations for 
addressing crucial transitional justice issues. Such reliance in the aftermath of 
three decades of authoritarian rule that earned the country international censor 
clearly places a question mark over the administration’s sincerity and the degree 
of its commitment to justice, human rights and the rule of law in the country. In 
this regard, the action of the elected executive seriously impaired the fulcrum and 
raison d’être of the transition. This concession notwithstanding, the transition 
judiciary on its part cannot be excused for its fixation on a rational legal 
formalism that is impoverished by its lack of engagement with the socio-political 
circumstances of the country and the developments in the international arena. 
In coming to a decision that struck at the root of the truth-telling process 
epitomised by the Oputa Panel, the Nigerian judiciary in the Oputa Panel Case 
arguably undermined the rule of law (even if not deliberately), in the course of the 
country’s transition from authoritarian rule. The attitude of the Court derived from 
an entrenched judicial tradition of plain-fact jurisprudence. The Court obviously 
accorded primacy to protecting the federal character of the Nigerian polity over 
the rights of victims of gross violations of human rights.  
It is noteworthy that the violations in issue were largely committed by 
military regimes that paid no more than rhetorical heed to the country’s federal 
character (like most other established aspects of the country’s law and politics) 
and (mis)ruled it in a virtually unitary fashion. In deference to the supremacy of 
military laws (decrees), the judiciary hardly intervened to check the various 
violations of the constitution in this regard. It is thus ironic that the transitional 
judiciary at the highest levels will advert to the territoriality argument as 
justification to shield alleged perpetrators from accountability.  
 Further, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s position that 
Sections 5(d)11(1) (b), 11 (4) and 12(2) of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act are 
unconstitutional and invalid because they empower a tribunal of inquiry to 
compel attendance or impose a sentence of fine or imprisonment. According to 
the Court, the sections contravene sections 35 and 36 of the Constitution of 
Nigeria 1999 that provide for the right to liberty and fair hearing respectively. 
Mandatory attendance at a truth commission was viewed as contrary to the right 
to personal liberty. The Court insisted that under the Constitution, only a court of 
law can make an order to deprive a citizen of his fundamental right to personal 
liberty. While this position of the Court is attractive, it is arguably not sustainable 
considering the provisions of section 35 (1) (b) that  
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Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be 
deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure permitted by law… by reason of his failure to comply with the order 
of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation imposed upon 
him by law.17 
 
The Court placed reliance on section 35 (1), which provides for 
deprivation of liberty in execution of the judgement of a court, as if it were the 
only derogative clause to individual liberty in the constitution. Such an 
interpretive approach is, it is humbly submitted, in view of section 35 (1) (b), 
erroneous. Surely, the Court could on the basis of the proviso in section 35 (1) (b) 
have upheld the ‘coercive’ powers of the commission under the 1999 
Constitution, even without recourse to comparative legislation and jurisprudence 
in South Africa, another common law jurisdiction with relevant (and at least 
persuasive) precedent on the issue. After all, the President constituted the Oputa 
Panel under a law and the duty to attend the summons of the Commission 
challenged by the Plaintiffs was imposed by the TIA.  
Curious and more objectionable still is the finding that the powers of the 
Commission contravened fair-hearing provisions of section 36 of the Nigerian 
constitution. It is a basic procedural practice that has been upheld by the courts (in 
Nigeria and elsewhere) that evidentiary rules weigh against a party who fails to 
utilise reasonable opportunity provided to air the party’s side of a case, as a result 
of which such party can not be heard to complain about lack of fair hearing. On 
the facts in the Oputa case, the provisions of section 36, it is respectfully 
submitted should not have inured to the benefit of the generals. The Oputa Panel 
summoned the generals as witnesses on the strength of petitions it received and 
they initiated the case to obtain judicial sanction for depriving the petitioners and 
the Nigerian society the benefit of the facts peculiarly within their knowledge. 
Contestations around the legality of the Commission in various suits and 
appeals on them instigated by the generals in an attempt at self-preservation 
brought to the fore the tension that may arise between the truth-telling process and 
the judiciary in transition. More importantly, the Oputa Panel Case in the context 
of a transitioning polity arguably demonstrates the dangers inherent in the 
existence of an accountability gap with respect to the judiciary. Such an 
accountability gap bequeaths a polity with a judiciary that may be immune to the 
changes taking place in the transition environment all around it.18  
Former authoritarian military rulers are reputedly difficult to bring to 
accounts. Roehrig has noted that any attempt to ensure accountability for 
violations of human rights by past military regime in post-authoritarian societies 
                                                 
17 Emphasis mine. 
18 See generally Yusuf, Hakeem O “Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional 
Justice and Judicial Accountability in Nigeria” Law and Policy 30 (2) (2008) forthcoming.  
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is fraught with complexities.19 There is some convergence of opinion on this view. 
This does not, however, provide justification for avoiding the challenge of re-
establishing the supremacy of law over authoritarian exercise of power which had 
deprived individuals, groups and society in general, of their rights. Supreme 
Courts in particular have a unique role in a constitutional democracy20 in the 
pursuit of this objective. 
In the foregoing state of affairs, judicial commitment to the duty to bring 
alive the law as an agent of positive transformation (largely viewed as essentially 
revolving around the executive and the legislature) is seriously jeopardised or at 
least in doubt. The phenomenon has been aptly described by Teitel as ‘the rule of 
law dilemma.’21 Teitel has criticized the accounts of law in transitional justice 
contexts as a product of political change and the restrictive potential it accords the 
transformative potentials of law in hitherto conflicted societies.22  
In analyses of what now constitutes pioneering experiences in the 
‘contemporary wave of political change’ in diverse regions of the world (Eastern 
Europe through Latin America to Africa), she identifies the judiciary as a 
powerful institutional agent for transformation. But as she further notes, the 
judiciary is itself faced with enormous challenges in the mediation of ensuing 
transitional tensions. Teitel locates the major reason for this in the distinctive 
nature of law and justice in transitional contexts. Law and justice as handmaidens 
of change make a paradigm shift in transitions. Law is moulded by and also 
remoulds the society in the flux of transition. The exigencies of the transition 
context demand new conceptions of law and justice that are at once 
‘transformative…extraordinary and constructivist.’23  
The foregoing formulation constitutes what can be considered a 
historicization of law and justice within the context of transitions. I argue that it 
ought to be not only a legitimate option for judicial mediation of ensuing conflicts 
in transitions but the option where the judiciary has been implicated in violations 
of human rights in the period of conflict or authoritarian rule. Adjudication by a 
‘transitional judiciary’24 in neglect of the sui generis role of law and thus, the 
adjudicatory function, positively threatens the aspirations for change constitutive 
of the whole process of political transition. Further, it raises the question of the 
                                                 
19 Roehrig, Terence. The Prosecution of Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The 
Cases of Argentina, Greece and South Korea (North Carolina: McFarland & Company Inc. 
Publishers 2002). 
20 See generally Barak note 11 supra. 
21 Teitel, Ruti G. “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation” Yale 
Law Journal 106 (7) (1996-7): 2009, at 2018-2022. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. at 2014. 
24 Ibid. at 2030. 
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continued relevance of that arm of government in the post-conflict era and its 
ability to foster the rule of law.  
 
The Judiciary, Transition and the Transformative Agenda 
 
The gap in governance created by such political power-dynamics 
accentuates the need for a judiciary committed to engaging constructively with 
the transformative agenda,25 ideally the hallmark of and legitimising justification 
for the transition in the first place. This is particularly relevant in the context of a 
transition that has resulted not in real (as is the aspiration of the people and 
mantra of the elites now in power) but a virtual democracy. In other words, a 
situational dynamic in which the ruling elite have perfected the art of 
manipulating the transition process in a way that does not dislocate their hold on 
power and yet creates the impression that liberal democracy has been instituted.26 
The transition to democratic rule in Nigeria presents a good example of this socio-
political dynamic.  
The elections in the political transition from over three decades of 
authoritarian rule were strongly contested or influenced by civilians who had held 
offices under the past military governments or were actually retired military 
officers in past military regimes.27 Ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo epitomised 
this dynamic. The former army general and military head of state is generally 
believed to have been tipped and largely sponsored for president in 1999 by the 
country’s former self-styled ‘military president’, General Ibrahim Babangida. 
General Muhammadu Buhari, himself a former military head of state remains one 
of the frontline contenders to the presidency while General Babangida only 
dropped his presidential ambitions shortly before the April 2007 elections.  
The current president of the Nigerian Senate (the upper house in the two-
tier legislature, the National Assembly), is also a retired general and ex-military 
governor of a state, just as the longest-serving chairman of the ruling People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), Ahmadu Ali, is a retired army general and one time 
                                                 
25 Corder, Hugh “Judicial Policy in a Transforming Constitution” in Morison, John et al (eds.) 
Judges, Transition and Human Rights (Oxford: University Press Oxford 2007) 91, 93. 
26  Joseph, Richard. “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical 
Perspectives” Comparative Politics 29 (3) (1997):363, 367-8. See also Prempeh, H Kwasi. 
“Africa’s ‘Constitutional Revival’: False Start or New Dawn” International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 5(3) (2007):469, 505: “Indeed, Africa’s recent democratic transitions have 
become an occasion for recycling old elites, not for the emergence of a new generation of 
leadership.” 
27 Oyekola, Tunde “Ex-Military Officers are Doing Well in Politics- Gowon” Nigerian Tribune 
(Lagos Tuesday 4 September 2007) 
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Minister for Education.28 A number of state governors, lawmakers in the federal 
and state legislatures, ministers and other key public office holders are ex-military 
men, who occupied strategic public positions under various military regimes in 
the country. The phenomenon aptly referred to as ‘feigned’ ruler conversion29 
situates the judiciary as the unlikely institution of state for holding out the 
prospect of a genuine realisation of democracy and rule of law commitment as 
underpinning the political transition. 
The situation in Nigeria is not unique as the experience in Ghana (whose 
political history shares more than a passing similarity with the former) embodied 
in what has been referred to as the ‘Rawlings factor’ has shown. Jerry Rawlings’ 
hold on power in the country in the post-authoritarian transition period was so 
potent that it staved off accountability for human rights violations for eight years 
after the transition to democracy. This should be no surprise. He was elected 
civilian president under a transition programme he instituted and supervised. 
Beyond that, it also reputedly conditioned largely, the choice of transitional 
justice mechanism finally adopted by the successor administration to achieve 
accountability for human rights violations.30 The politics of transitions in post-
communist Eastern Europe and Latin America have followed a similar course.31 
The reason for this may not be far-fetched; democratic politics for all of its merits 
is after all a game played with resources (financial and material) usually in 
abundance in the arsenals of erstwhile authoritarian rulers, usually privileged by 
plundered state resources amassed during their tenure. Against this backdrop, it is 
little wonder that the political dividend the transition process has delivered is a 
quasi-democracy.32  
Again, the formidable challenges posed by powerful ex-military rulers 
against efforts to obtain justice in the transition period are largely consistent with 
the mixed results and varied experience of attempts elsewhere. While in some 
Latin American countries like Argentina, prosecutions were later ‘rolled back’ in 
deference to military take-over threats,33 the judiciary in Greece contributed 
                                                 
28 Abayomi, John. “Ali, PDP Chairman Resigns” Vanguard Online (Lagos Monday 8 October 
2007). Available at:  
http://www.vanguardngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=288&Itemid=43 
29 Joseph note 26 supra at 250-251. 
30 Oduro, Franklin. “Reconciling a Divided Nation through a Non-Retributive Justice Approach: 
Ghana’s National Reconciliation Initiative” The International Journal of Human Rights 9 (3) 
(2005):327, 340-342. See also Attafuah, Ken A. “An Overview of Ghana’s National 
Reconciliation Commission and Its Relationship with the Courts” Criminal Law Forum 15 (1-2) 
(2004)125. 
31 Teitel note 21 supra at  
32 Okafor note 6 supra at 86. 
33  For an elucidatory account of the challenges in Argentina’s transition from military 
authoritarian rule in the early ‘80s, see Nino, Carlos S. Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996). 
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positively and directly to the restoration of the rule of law by way of fearless 
adjudication in prosecutions involving erstwhile military rulers in the country.  
According to Teitel, twice over confronted with the dilemma of the rule of 
law, the courts in Germany adopted a jurisprudence in which ‘moral right’ 
trumped formalist (plain-fact) approach to law, lending credence to the view that 
transitional justice necessitates a sui generis conception of law. In the context of 
post-communist Eastern Europe’s experience in transition to liberal democracy, 
the Hungarian judiciary similarly opted for a transition-sensitive response to the 
rule of law dilemma by protecting the individual’s right to security. Teitel posits 
that conditioned by different ‘historical and political legacies’, both judiciaries 
arrived at similar results of ‘transformative understandings’ of the rule of law 
despite charting different courses.34 
The judiciary at all times, but especially in the flux of the transition 
context, must be wary of the designs of any individual or group to have recourse 
to judicial process as a shield against justice. This is particularly important for the 
restoration and fortification of the rule of law in a transitional setting. Such 
awareness appears to have been lost on the Nigerian Courts in this case. It is a 
paradox that the military would have recourse to the rights-regime and the courts 
to stave off accountability. While in power, when it was not busy corrupting or 
trying to subvert the judiciary through bribery and exclusion clauses, it treated its 
efforts at judicial independence with contempt at best. 
Military governance is unarguably a violation of the rule of law. It violates 
the constitution of virtually every modern state. Indeed the military usually 
subjugate the constitution to their political caprice and at least in the African 
experience, in legal subterfuge, declare their incursion into governance as a 
revolution to preserve the polity.  
In Nigeria, the judiciary had become largely impotent in upholding the 
rights of individuals in the era of military rule in the country. In the appeal case of 
Nwosu v Environmental Sanitation Authority,35 to take but one example, a Justice 
of the Supreme Court boldly advised victims of rights violations to seek redress 
elsewhere. He concluded that the Military left no one in doubt as to the 
inviolability of their decrees. This apologia was borne as much out of a sense of 
frustration of the courts with the importunate and contemptuous treatment of 
judicial decisions (and the institution as a whole) by successive military 
administrations as from an attempt at self-preservation. In a way though, it 
reinforces the need for accountability for the nature of judicial governance during 
the years of authoritarian rule. How or why was this possible? Considered against 
the background of the intransigence of the Nigerian military class towards the 
judicial institution and the rule of law while in power, it is paradoxical that the 
                                                 
34 Teitel note 21 supra at 2019-2027. 
35 [1990] 2 NWLR pt.135, 688. 
11
Yusuf: Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transitions
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
military would turn to the courts ostensibly to protect their rights. However, that 
recourse reinforces the proposition that a virile, dynamic, independent judiciary is 
central to the nurture of democracy and human rights. 
The decisions of the Nigerian courts in the legal challenges to the Oputa 
Panel, the key mechanism in the process of restoring human rights and achieving 
justice for victims of impunity in the transition to democratic rule raises some 
concerns regarding how the courts intend to respond to the demands for justice 
and acknowledge violations of human rights. This also extends to what the role of 
the courts will be in mediating critical conflicts in the transition era and beyond.  
One of the concerns is that it appears the courts are pliant to the wishes of 
ex-military rulers (who appointed most of them). The latter continue to participate 
directly, by proxies or hover visibly in the background of socio-political life in the 
country. This leaves a question mark over their required decisional independence. 
Another is the fact that despite the recourse of the plaintiffs to human rights 
provisions as one of the twin basis of their case, none of the Courts, not even the 
Supreme Court, seized on the opportunity to invoke the obligations of the country 
under international human rights law. Taken together, the two issues raise a third 
and one perhaps more profound: judges continue to apply and interpret laws 
inherited from the authoritarian period with ‘uncritical vigour’36 that was the 
hallmark of their decisions at the time the laws were handed down by dictatorial 
regimes.  
Significantly, counsel to one of the Appellants/Defendants had canvassed 
that ‘…the Tribunal of Inquiry (the HRVIC) was set up in connection with 
violation of human rights… for the purpose of implementing a treaty.’37 This 
provided the Court with the opportunity for advertence to the treaty obligations of 
the country under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),38 the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and customary 
international law. But while the Court conceded that the HRVIC was set up in 
connection with human rights violations, it rejected out of hand any link with the 
country’s treaty obligations. In the view of the Court, there was nothing in the 
enabling law (the TIA) to validate that proposition. It thus rejected one of the 
mediating forces in transition as theorised by Teitel. That line of reasoning also 
deprived the Court a core value of international law in providing stable 
understandings of the rule of law in transitional contexts.39  
                                                 
36 Corder note 25 supra. 
37 Brigadier-General Togun (Rtd.) V Hon. Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) & 2 others and 
General Ibrahim Babangida & 1 other [2001] 16 NWLR pt. 740, 597 at 662 (cases consolidated 
on the orders of the court). Hereafter, Togun v Oputa (No.2). 
38 10 December 1948 UN GA Res.217 A (III). 
39 Teitel note 21 supra at 2028. 
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It is interesting to note that it was not an issue of debate nor was it 
suggested that any of the judges who were all invariably appointed by the 
authoritarian military regimes40 should resign despite the questionable role the 
judiciary played in the pre-transition period. None did. This followed the pattern 
elsewhere.41 The oversight that has left the judiciary intact, no doubt strengthened 
in the Nigerian experience by a tradition of military-imposed constitutionalism 
may be partly responsible for the apathy to the policy issues surrounding the 
Oputa Panel Case. 
It is arguable that the judiciary is obliged to resolve the issues at stake in 
the Oputa Case from the perspective of its national as well as international 
significance. From the national perspective, the country is in search of a lasting 
transition to a democratic society where the rule of law will substitute whimsical, 
authoritarian and usually, brutish deprivation of political, economic, social and 
cultural rights. Not a few Nigerians had been denied their rights in the period of 
military rule aptly described in the words of Justice Oputa in (biblical allusion, no 
doubt) as ‘the years of the locust’.  
On the international level, the country was in dire need of assuming its 
pride of place in the comity of nations as the foremost black nation in the world 
considering its enormous potentials in the light of its human and material 
resources. More importantly, the country’s legal obligations under international 
human rights covenants required the deployment of an effective mechanism to 
secure reparations for victims of gross violations of human rights, which ought to 
be promoted by a robust engagement of the judiciary with transitional justice 
process. 
 
Safety in a Cocoon: Ignoring International Human Rights Law 
 
The Court ought to have taken cognisance of the transitional status of the 
country, seize the opportunity to enunciate and identify with the developing 
jurisprudence of the imperative for accountability and justice for victims of gross 
human rights violations through an affirmation of the right to truth.42 Some 
scholars43 are of the view that this right is guaranteed by Article 19 of the UDHR 
and Article 9(1) the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). 
While the former has come to assume the status of customary international law, 
the country is party to the latter. 
                                                 
40 Appointments made in the intervening years of civil democratic governance; 1 October 1960- 
15 January1965 and 1 October 1979- 31 December 1983 must qualify this. 
41 South Africa is a good example. See for instance Corder note 25 supra at 93.  
42 Hayner, Priscilla B. “Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study” Human 
Rights Quarterly 16 (1994): 597, 607 and 611 (Emphasis mine).  
43 Quinn, Joanna R. “Dealing with a Legacy of Mass Atrocity: Truth Commissions in Uganda and 
Chile” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 19 (4) (2001): 383, 388.  
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been the most progressive 
of existing human rights mechanisms in its explication and development of a 
jurisprudence affirming a right to truth for victims of human rights violations. The 
Court, along with its sister mechanism, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights faced with a large number of ‘enforced disappearance cases’44 has 
stated in a number of its decisions that there is a right to truth for relations of 
victims of such disappearances.45 The locus classicus on the matter is the case of 
Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras46 where the court held that relations of an 
individual who was arrested, reportedly tortured and then ‘disappeared’ were 
entitled to have the report of an independent and transparent investigation carried 
out by the State into the disappearance. 
Counsel to the HRVIC advanced the argument (without success) that the 
Commission was properly set up under the ACHPR. The Court held that for this 
to avail there was the need for specific legislation setting up the HRVIC and 
investing it with powers to carry out an inquiry of the nature the HRVIC was 
meant to accomplish.47 The constitutional panel48 of the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
made only a dismal reference to international human rights law.  
The socio-political circumstances of the country at the time required the 
courts to adopt a reflexive jurisprudence in the determination of the Oputa Case. 
The Supreme Court of Nigeria in particular, ought to have proceeded on the 
premise that the issues arising from the case transcend the question of the 
personal rights of the plaintiffs. Regrettably, like the Court of Appeal, the 
Supreme Court preferred placing premium on how the ‘coercive’ powers of the 
commission interfered with individual rights. A broader perspective commends 
the view that the issues involved may no doubt ‘offend’49 individual rights. Yet 
they also border even if implicitly, on the obligation of the country to ensure that 
victims of human rights violations are provided with an opportunity to be heard 
and provided an effective remedy. 
The decisions of the Nigerian Courts on the Oputa Panel arguably 
demonstrate a glaring disconnection of the judiciary with the transitional realities 
                                                 
44 Davidson, Scott. The Inter-American Human Rights System (Aldershot Dartmouth: Ashgate 
Publishing Company 1997). 
45 See for instance Neira Alegria v Peru Inter American Court H.R series No.20 (1995), 16 HRLJ 
403. 
46 Inter-American Court H.R. Series C No.4 (1988), 9 HRLJ 212. 
47 Oputa Panel Case note 12 supra at 85-86. 
48 The full complement of 17 Supreme Court Justices does not sit en banc on cases as a panel 
unlike the US Supreme Court. 5 Justices constitute the Court in its ordinary appellate and original 
jurisdiction. A panel of 7 Justices sits over ‘constitutional’ matters. In legal circles, the 
‘Constitutional Panel’ is conventionally presumed to be the highest adjudicative forum in the 
country.  
49 Togun v Oputa (No.2) note 37 supra at 645. 
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of the society. As mentioned earlier, Nigeria ratified the ACHPR in 1982. The 
country had gone further to incorporate it into domestic legislation as far back as 
August 1983. The Supreme Court of Nigeria is bound to respect international 
customary law as embodied by the UDHR. It also has a ‘double’ obligation in 
respect of the ACHPR that is at once an international treaty and municipal 
legislation. The latter reinforces and expands the limited bills of rights 
encompassed in successive Nigerian constitutions including the current one of 
1999.   
The decisions of the Nigerian courts in the Oputa Panel Case reflect an 
impervious disposition to the current position of international human rights law 
on state obligations regarding victims’ right to truth and accountability in 
transitional societies. The attempt by counsel for the Oputa Panel to open the 
window was resisted by the only justice who did not go beyond a cursory 
reference to it. The significance and historic nature of the case does appear to 
have been lost on the courts. Ratification of international covenants by a state 
constitutes an undertaking to fulfil the commitments stated in them.  
A state voluntarily surrenders part of its sovereignty in ratifying 
international covenants. On questions of international law, treaty obligations and 
human rights, the decisions of the United Nations specialised committees and 
regional human rights institutions deserve more than a ‘persuasive’ status. This is 
in line with state-party obligations under international law. Such obligations 
include according recognition to decisions made by mechanisms established for 
ensuring compliance with the instruments. It can be argued that decisions on 
covenants’ provisions by appropriate bodies ought to be regarded as canons to be 
observed by contracting parties. Otherwise, the whole field of international law 
will be rendered irrelevant.  
 
Privileging the Domestic Law over International Law 
 
The foregoing further raise the propriety of the precedence sometimes 
accorded to domestic law (ordinary or constitutional) over international 
covenants. The issue is particularly topical in jurisdictions like Nigeria and South 
Africa where the constitution requires that a treaty must be enacted by the 
National Legislature in order for it to take effect as binding law in the country.50 
Nigerian courts have developed an ambivalent jurisprudence on the issue. In Gani 
Fawehinmi v General Sanni Abacha (Fawehinmi),51 the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
held that the provisions of the ACHPR cannot prevail over the Nigerian 
constitution. In the lead judgment, Ogundare JSC conceded that the Charter as 
enacted under Nigerian Law (Cap. No.10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
                                                 
50 See s.12 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
51 (2001) CHR 20. 
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1990) possessed an ‘international flavour’ and ‘a greater vigour and strength than 
any other domestic statute’. However, he proceeded to hold that  
 
But that is not to say that the Charter is superior to the constitution…Nor can its 
international flavour prevent the National Assembly…removing it from our 
body of municipal laws by simply repealing Cap No.10.52 
 
With that, the constitutional (and highest) panel of the Supreme Court 
overruled the decision of the Court of Appeal. The latter had accorded special and 
decidedly higher status to the ACHPR.53 The Court of Appeal had decided that the 
international statute had superior status to other municipal laws. It is submitted 
that the position of the Court of Appeal that accords special recognition to the 
statute as an international covenant ought to be the correct statement of the law. 
The judicial position that constitutions of state constitutions  are superior 
to international law the same state has contracted to adhere to cannot be valid. 
Such jurisprudence hits at the roots of international law. It is standard to find that 
treaties provide for the binding nature of their provisions on state parties and 
require that they take adequate measures for the implementation of their 
provisions. A good example is Article 2 of the ICCPR 
 
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each 
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in 
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the 
present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.54 
 
 In view of Article 2 of the ICCPR, it should not be open to municipal 
courts to override treaty provisions by domestic law. Cases of apparent or implicit 
conflict between the two ought to be resolved in favour of international law. This 
is consistent with Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention.55 Article 26 
affirms the binding obligation created by treaties on contracting states. Article 27 
provides that provisions of domestic law may not be invoked to justify failure to 
perform treaty obligations.  
The Nigerian courts ignored the obligation of the country under the 
ICCPR. Article 2(3) provides that individuals whose rights or freedoms 
recognized by the covenant are violated are entitled to an effective remedy. The 
ICCPR similarly guarantees to an individual claiming such a remedy a right to 
have his claim determined ‘…by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
                                                 
52 Ibid. at 42. 
53 It is enacted as Cap.10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. 
54 Emphasis mine. 
55 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concluded at Vienna 23 May 1969. Entered into 
force 27 January 1980; U.K.T.S (1980), Cmnd 7964; UNTS 331. 
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authorities or by any other competent authority provided by the legal system of 
the State’. The latter clause any other competent authority covers a Truth 
Commission established by law (like the Oputa Panel) with a mandate inter alia, 
to ‘investigate’ cases of rights violations and ‘make recommendations’ for 
‘appropriate compensation.’  
The Oputa Panel clearly constituted the strongest if not the only 
mechanism chosen by the government to comply with its obligations in this 
context as discussed earlier. The mandate of the Commission addressed virtually 
all foregoing obligations. Only a handful of individuals (less than ten) were facing 
criminal charges at the time for some of the atrocities committed during the 
Abacha regime. To date, none of the trials has been concluded. Over 8 years 
protracted trial of the former Chief of Army Staff, General Ishaiya Bamaiyi and 
four other minions of the late dictator, General Sanni Abacha, in The State v 
General Isahiya Bamaiyi & 4Ors56 typifies how the current state of Nigeria’s 
criminal law and procedure can be exploited by powerful individuals to frustrate 
the administration of criminal justice in the country.  
It is pertinent that in the context of the transition in Nigeria, the rights of 
victims to obtain a remedy thereby relied on a great extent on the truth-telling 
process. It was quite open to the Supreme Court in particular as the court of last 
resort to have taken the expansive view of the facts and law and come to a 
radically different decision. Disappointingly, it took a rather restricted view of the 
issues in the case. The decision did not take cognisance of the fact that the nation 
was at the threshold of history, in transition and making a decisive break with a 
past of human rights violations.  
Truth Commissions have now acquired the status of a recognised 
mechanism for addressing past human rights abuses in transitional societies.57 
They have taken a position of increased significance alongside other transitional 
justice mechanisms. They play an important role in efforts to restore the rule of 
law in post-conflict societies. The Supreme Court ought to have seized upon the 
reliance of the applicants on the fundamental rights provisions guaranteed by the 
constitution to consider the right of victims to a remedy as provided by the 
foregoing provisions. This would have provided it with a balanced progressive 
jurisprudence on the matter.  
 
                                                 
56 LD/7C/99. See for instance V Efeizomor “Lagos to Review Bamaiyi, Al-Mustapha’s Case” 
Daily Independent Online Edition (Lagos Nigeria Monday 23 July 2007). 
57 UN Security Council Document No.S/2004/616 Report of the Secretary–General ‘The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies’1at17. Available at: 
<http://www.daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElemen
t> (10th October 2005). 
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Policy Considerations and Transitional Justice Claims 
 
Asides normative imperatives of international law, policy considerations 
should have been positively taken into account by the Court to the benefit of the 
defendants in the Oputa Panel Case. Nwabueze has made the important point that 
consideration of public policy may contribute positively to judicial 
determinations. The guiding principle he advocates, is that public policy 
considerations, particularly of the subjective type, be subordinated to legal 
principles and ‘objective standards.’ He further suggests that ‘considerations of 
expediency’ in deserving instances ‘may justifiably inform the application of law 
by the courts in the solution to problems.’58 Nwabueze’s postulation on the value 
of public policy in judicial decision-making, it can be argued, supports the 
position that the Nigerian courts should have had advertence to the principle to 
decide the Oputa Panel Case in a manner cognisant of the societal expectations at 
the time in Nigeria’s socio-political history.  
A crucial issue on which the Nigerian courts found for the applicants was 
the unconstitutionality of the so-called ‘coercive’ or ‘compulsive’ powers of the 
Commission. These were the powers of the Commission to subpoena witnesses59 
and punish for contempt.60 The courts held that those powers impugned the 
fundamental right to liberty guaranteed by section 36 of the 1979 constitution of 
Nigeria (now section 46 of the 1999 constitution). This aspect of the decision in 
the Oputa Panel case, even from the purely formal legal point of view, is curious. 
The right to liberty under the Nigerian constitution of 1999 as well as earlier 
constitutions, and indeed in line with international human rights law and practice, 
can be and is in practice derogated from in defined circumstances. One context in 
which such derogation might take place concerns reasonable suspicion of the 
commission of an offence, which was precisely in issue before the Commission. 
A Truth Commission has an extended form of inquiry as its core function. 
This core function can be easily frustrated or defeated if the Commission lacks the 
power to summon witnesses and issue subpoena for the production of evidence. 
Such power is in state practice not at all novel for quasi-judicial bodies in the 
country in question. Similar powers are statutorily conferred and exercised with 
judicial sanction by professional disciplinary bodies in Nigeria.  
By way of comparison, the South African TRC had very wide powers to 
summon witnesses, subpoena evidence, and order the search of premises and 
seizure of materials61 as part of its notably ‘significant procedural powers.’62 
                                                 
58 Ibid. at 7-8.  
59 TIA note 13 supra Section 6  
60 Ibid. Section 11.  
61 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (PNURA) No.34 of 1995. See sec 30, 31, 
32 and 33. 
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Powers of similar purport were contained in the Ghana National Reconciliation 
Commission Act.63 It is doubtful that a truth commission without such powers can 
effectively carry out its functions.64 At the very least, the relevance of such a 
truth-telling process will be diminished. In all events, the Court ought to have 
positively construed the provisions of section 8 of the TIA that emphasised the 
fact-finding remit of the Oputa Panel. It provided that evidence taken under the 
Act shall be inadmissible against any person in any civil or criminal proceedings 
except in the case of a person charged with giving false evidence before the 
members. Section 10 further reinforces the protection granted to witnesses 
testifying before the Commission by restating the rule against self-incrimination 
at the standard set for witnessing before a court of law.  
In contrast, a reflexive jurisprudence suggesting a constructive 
engagement with the process of transition was enunciated by the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa in litigation challenging the truth-telling process in the 
country’s transition to popular democracy. The decision of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa (the Constitutional Court) in Azanian Peoples’ 
Organisation (AZAPO) & 3 Ors v President of the Republic of South Africa 4 Ors 
(the AZAPO Case)65 stands out in this regard. The applicants sought an order 
declaring the amnesty provisions in section 20 of the TRC Act void. They were 
particularly aggrieved that section 20(7) of the TRC Act extinguished criminal or 
civil liability of the perpetrator for the amnestied criminal act. The absolution 
from liability also extended to the state as well as any other body, individual or 
corporate that would have been vicariously liable for the violation in question.  
In approaching the issue, the Constitutional Court conceded that the 
provisions could be considered a limitation of the constitutional provisions on the 
right to seek settlement of disputes in a court of law guaranteed by section 22 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. In resolving the issue, the Court 
resorted to the constitution to determine whether there was any other provision 
that permitted a limitation to the right in section 22. In the event there was none, it 
sought to determine whether the limitation could be justified in terms of section 
33(1) of that constitution which allowed for some limitations by ‘law of general 
application’ to rights provided in the constitution. However, the Court placed 
premium on the fact that the society was in transition.  
Thus, while the Constitutional Court recognised that  
                                                                                                                                     
62 Christodoulidis, Emilios A. ‘“Truth and Reconciliation’ As Risks” (2000) 9/2 Social & Legal 
Studies, 179,186. 
63 See s.15 and 16 of the National Reconciliation Commission Act 2002 (Ghana). 
64  Richard, Wilson. “Violent Truths: The Politics of Memory in Guatemala,” Accord: An 
International Review of Peace Initiatives (1997), http://www.c-
r.org/accord/guat/accord2/wilson.shtml. 
65 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Case CCT 17/96 25 July 1996, 1-56; [1996] 4 South 
Africa Reports 671. 
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every human being must feel grave discomfort in living with a consequence which might 
allow the perpetrators of evil acts to walk the streets of this land with impunity, protected 
in their freedom by an amnesty immune from constitutional attack66 
 
 it preferred to be guided by the dynamics of the transitional context when it 
stated that ‘the circumstances in support of this course require carefully to be 
appreciated.’67 In recognition of the social context, the Constitutional Court 
emphasised the need to provide an environment conducive to the emergence of 
the truth. The Constitutional Court held that surfacing the truth could only be 
achieved where perpetrators were assured that they would not be liable to trials, 
criminal or civil, when coming forward to give their testimonies. The question of 
amnesty as a part of the truth-telling process, the court noted was part of a 
‘historical situation’ the country was confronted with in the process of transition 
to a democratic order.68 
Arguably, the Constitutional Court was aided in its decision by the fact 
that the operative constitution was negotiated for a society in transition. Thus, the 
court held that 
 
The real answer …seems to lie in the more fundamental objectives of the 
transition sought to be attained by the constitution and articulated in the epilogue 
itself. What the constitution seeks to do is to facilitate the transition to a new 
democratic order, committed to ‘reconciliation between the people of South 
Africa and the reconstruction of society’. 69  
 
But the purposive interpretation placed on the constitutional provisions by 
the unanimous decision of the Constitutional Court was central to achieving the 
historic purpose.70 This is particularly so when it is considered that Mahomed DP, 
delivering the lead judgement, concluded inter alia that his decision to uphold the 
amnesty provisions of the TRC Act was based on the ‘most comprehensive and 
generous’ view of the relevant constitutional provisions.71  
It is pertinent to note that while the decision in the AZAPO Case upholding 
the constitutionality of the amnesty procedure served to progress the truth-telling 
process in South Africa, it is noteworthy that though the Oputa Case acts as an 
example of negative interaction between the transitional judiciary and transitional 
justice mechanisms, it is by no means unique. The ensuing tension is similarly 
reflected in a few other legal challenges to the TRC. A notable example is the 
                                                 
66 AZAPO Case note 65 supra 17. 
67Ibid. at 17. Emphasises mine. 
68 AZAPO Case note 65 supra at 22.  
69Ibid. at 38 per Mahomed DP. 
70 It is apt to note the decision was also a unanimous one. 
71 AZAPO Case note 65 supra at 44. 
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decision of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa (now the 
Supreme Court of Appeal) in Brigadier Jan du Preez and Major Gen. Nick van 
Rensburg v Truth and Reconciliation Commission.72 The TRC pursuant to its 
powers to determine its rules of procedure under section 30 of the TRC Act, 
sought to create an informal and culturally-sensitive atmosphere for victims to 
narrate their experiences before the Human Rights Violations Committee 
(HRVC). One of the ways to achieve the ways it hoped to achieve this was by 
excluding cross-examination.  
Brigadier Jan du Preez and Major Gen. Nick van Rensburg challenged the 
validity of section 30 of the TRC Act. They claimed it was in violation of section 
24 of the 1993 of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The 
TRC had caused to be served on them notices to the effect that ‘an unnamed 
witness would testify that they were involved in, or had knowledge about, the 
poisoning and disappearance of a person, also unnamed’ at stated location and 
date. They demanded prior service of the statements of the witnesses before the 
scheduled hearings, a request the TRC turned down. The case for the TRC was 
that the remit of the Committee was investigatory and not judicial and thus it 
ought not to be bound by the legal formalism of courts.  
The Supreme Court upheld the objection of the Applicants on the premise 
that the TRC was obliged to observe the principles of natural justice 
notwithstanding the nature of the proceedings. Once the TRC received 
information that may be prejudicial to a person, it was under obligation to furnish 
the concerned individual with such information prior to its being heard publicly as 
information of that nature could lead to criminal proceedings. The decision 
significantly hampered the work of the TRC. It led to not only logistics problems 
but also the rather awkward circumstance of prior exposure of the Commission’s 
report to alleged perpetrators.73 
Unlike the constitutional situation in South Africa, the 1999 constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria under which the truth-telling process in Nigeria 
reflected in the Oputa Case was challenged by the generals, remains much-
contested. Mid-wife and imposed by the military as part of a transition to civil 
rule programme, it lacked public ownership.74 Again, as earlier noted, the truth-
telling process was initiated by executive action under an existing legislation as 
                                                 
72 1996 (3) SALR 997 (A) at 233C-E quoted in D 
73  TRC Report Volume 1 Chapter 7 page 174-186. Available at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/ (12 September 2007).  
74 See for instance Ogowewo, Tunde I. “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 
is Imperative to the Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy” Journal of African Law 44 (2000):135-166 
arguing that the constitution is illegal, lacks moral authority, constitutes a deceit and is thus void.  
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against the purpose-designed legislation of the TIC. This may have piled the 
stakes somewhat against the Oputa Panel. 
The needs of the times; restoration of the rule of law, reparations for 
victims of gross human rights and transformation of societal institutions, required 
an activist consideration of the issues arising from the truth-telling process. The 
Nigerian courts ought to have broken away from the conservative stance 
characteristic of traditional commonwealth judiciaries and opt for a jurisprudence 
reflecting not a ‘legalistic’ consideration of the issues in contention but an activist 
posture that is sensitive to the ‘ideals of the nation.’75  
The decision of the Supreme Court could have been different if it took a 
purposive approach to the legislation in question. Such an approach would allow 
it to uphold the establishment of the Commission for investigating past human 
rights violations as a measure for ensuring ‘order and good government of the 
Federation or any part thereof’. Section 4 (1) of the Constitution of 1999 confers 
this power on the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
 
3. TWO DECISIONS AND THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH: 
HOPES FOR TRANSFORMATION? 
 
The PDP Case: When Death is not to Die  
Achieving institutional transformation presents ‘profound challenges’ to states in 
transition. How to deal with existing states institutions with a record of 
inadequacies in governance or even outright complicity for human rights 
violations have also tasked transitional justice analysts.76  
Institutional engagement with the transitional contexts would be required 
for the desired transformation. Such a commendable recognition of and 
engagement with the transitional context of the country was displayed by the 
majority decision of the Supreme Court (constitutional panel) in the earlier case of 
Peoples Democratic Party & 1Or. v. Independent National Electoral & 4Ors 
(PDP Case).77  
 
 A Lacuna, a Formidable Minority and a Slim Majority 
 
The case emanated from the Transition to Civil Rule Programme of the 
military regime led by General Abdussalami Abubakar in 1999. The crux of the 
matter was that following his election in the gubernatorial elections as Governor-
                                                 
75 Nwabueze, Benjamin O. Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa-Role of Courts in Government 
(London: C Hurst &Company 1977) 75. 
76 Ni Aolain and Campbell note 2 supra at 200. 
77 (1999) 7 S.C Part II 35. 
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elect of Adamawa State,78 Atiku Abubakar (and before he was to take the oath of 
office), was subsequently nominated by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to run as his 
vice-presidential candidate on the platform of the same party, the PDP. They won 
the presidential election on that joint ticket.  
The situation was thus that Atiku was no longer available to be sworn in as 
Governor of Adamawa State. The electoral body, the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC), indicated its intention to conduct a bye-election 
for the office of Governor and Deputy Governor in the State on the premise that 
Abubakar’s acceptance to run as vice-presidential candidate rendered the position 
of Governor–elect vacant. In a letter sent to him by INEC, the electoral body 
averred that since he had not been sworn-in, his deputy could not ‘automatically 
take over the position.’ Bonnie Haruna, Atiku’s running mate, challenged that 
move in court, contending that he ought to be sworn-in as governor in the 
circumstances.  
Faced with the situation where there was an obvious lacuna in respect of a 
key issue in electoral legislation in an all-important transitional process, the 
learned justices reasoned that for the court to perform its constitutional functions 
 
effectively and satisfactorily, it must be purposive in its construction of the 
provisions of the constitution. Where the constitution bestows a right on the 
citizen… we have the duty and indeed the obligation to ensure that the inured 
right is not lost or denied the citizen by construction that is narrow and not 
purposive.79 
 
The Court held that the intention of the framers of the law was to provide 
for situations where for one reason or the other (the ultimate being death), the 
deputy governor should step into the office of the governor where the latter is no 
longer available to take up his position.80 The Court with a split decision of 4 to 3; 
(Uwais, Chief Justice of Nigeria with the majority, Justices Ogundare Mohammed 
and Uwaifo strongly dissenting) thus abandoned the unambiguous provisions of 
the law and sought to discover legislative intent in a radical and implicit 
recognition of the unique situation of transition from decades of military 
authoritarian rule to civil democratic governance.  
Specifically, Uwais CJN, in the lead judgement decided that the provisions 
of section 37(1) of the State Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional 
Provisions) Decree 3 of 1998, to the effect that 
 
If a person duly elected as governor dies before taking and subscribing the oath 
of allegiance and oath of office, the person elected with him as deputy shall be 
                                                 
78 One of Nigeria’s thirty-six. 
79 PDP Case note 77 supra at 47-48. Emphasises mine. 
80 Ibid. at 71-72. 
23
Yusuf: Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transitions
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
sworn in as governor and he shall nominate a new deputy governor from the 
same senatorial district as that of the deceased governor who shall, with the 
approval of the House of Assembly of the state be appointed as deputy governor. 
 
must be liberally construed. Leading the majority, he maintained there was 
nothing sacrosanct about the word ‘die’ in the provision thereby reversing the 
premise for the decision of the Court of Appeal that had preferred the literal (plain 
fact) approach. Rather, it should be liberally construed to accommodate a case 
where the elected candidate was ‘unavailable’ to be sworn in. It dismissed the 
plain fact interpretation approach adopted by the Court of Appeal as ‘narrow and 
restrictive’ and sometimes inappropriate to fulfilling or advancing ‘the intention, 
spirit, objects, and purposes of the Constitution.’81 
The Supreme Court went on to hold that since in relinquishing his 
Governor-elect status Atiku Abubakar was irrevocably barred from reclaiming it, 
his action could, in the words of the Court be ‘likened to permanent incapacity or 
even death.’ In the circumstances, his action came within the contemplation of the 
relevant provisions of the law.82 For this proposition, the Court relied heavily on 
the provisions of section 45(1) of the same law, which provides for the Deputy 
Governor to hold the office of Governor where the latter becomes vacant due to 
death, permanent incapacity or removal for any reason.  
The majority judgment was strongly83 criticised in the dissenting 
judgements as deliberate usurpation of the legislative function under the guise of 
interpretation. Ogundare JSC objected to what he rightly sensed was a ‘policy’ 
decision. The duty of the Court, he insisted was not to ‘determine what the 
legislature meant to say but what it actually said.’84 The plain fact interpretation 
according to the learned justice was the proper approach and it was not within the 
competence of the Court to attempt modification of unambiguous provisions to 
‘bring it into accordance with its own views as to what is reasonable.’85 He 
averred that any gap in legislation must be left to the legislature to fill for the 
contrary would amount to ‘judicial legislation’ that was not the function of a 
court. 
In the lead dissenting judgement, Ogundare JSC posited that there was no 
lacuna in any event, in the provisions of section 37(1) of the State Government 
                                                 
81 PDP Case note 77 supra at 71. 
82 Ibid. at 61. 
83 The dissent was so extensive it doubled the length of the lead judgement and the concurring 
decisions of the majority put together. Thus for instance whereas in the Judgements of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria Delivered in July 1999 (part II) (Lagos: Law Breed Limited 1999) the 
lead judgement and the three concurring judgements are reported on pages 35-72, the dissenting 
judgements takes up pages 73-149. 
84 PDP Case note 77 supra at 91. 
85 Ibid. at 93. 
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(Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree 3 of 1998 that was in 
contention.86 Subscribing to these views, Mohammed JSC similarly contended 
that ‘policy, expediency, political exigency and convenience’ ought to be 
excluded from constitutional interpretation87 thus implicitly (at the least) rejecting 
a reflexive jurisprudential approach to the transitional processes ongoing in the 
country at the time. In towing the line of dissent, Uwaifo JSC, expressly 
dismissed the majority’s preference for a ‘purposive approach.’ His position was 
based on what he (rightly) surmised was a radical change in the traditional 
jurisprudence of the Court 
 
[...] the line of decisions of this court on the preference for the literal 
interpretation of statutes whose words are clear, precise and unambiguous is 
intimidating and can not be ignored by sheer resort to another principle of 
interpretation which may in a sense tend to overrule or undermine those other 
decisions indirectly and without justification.88  
 
This was despite his concession that the liberal or broad interpretational 
approach was suited among others to ‘circumstances to cover such eventualities 
due to changing times, different social environments [...] not fully contemplated 
or overlooked at the time the constitution was drawn up.’89 He thus discounted the 
circumstances of political transition (arguably an inextricable part of the case), as 
not momentous (enough) to warrant a departure from the plain fact jurisprudential 
tradition of the Nigerian Supreme Court. 
 In fairness to the dissenting judgement, it is noteworthy that the 
provisions of section 45 unlike section 37(1) in fact and by the concession of the 
Court applies after the Governor and the Deputy Governor had been sworn-in. 
Thus, on the facts of the case, section 45 would be inapplicable. Yet, the Court in 
its majority decision took the view that since the legislation in issue was 
constitutional in nature, the document must be ‘read together as a whole.’ It thus 
had no problem in arriving at the decision that the rationale of the provisions 
taken together was to avoid a vacuum in the important office of Governor and 
ensure a ‘smooth’ succession.90 To hold otherwise in the context of a fragile 
transition with a highly sceptical public,91 wary of ‘transitions without end’ and 
                                                 
86 PDP Case note 77 supra at 85 to 99. Uwaifo JSC expressed similar sentiments. See page 126-
28. 
87 Ibid. at 111. 
88 Ibid. at 123 
89 Ibid. at 123. Emphasis mine. 
90 Ibid. at 72-73 
91 Lewis, Peter. Performance and Legitimacy in Nigeria’s Democracy- Afrobarometer Briefing 
Paper No.46 (July 2006) Available at: http://www.afrobarometer.org/Papers/AfrobriefNo46.pdf. 
(25 September 2007). The survey concludes that ‘popular attitudes suggest that Nigeria’s new 
democracy remains fragile, and suffers a growing deficit of popular confidence.’ (at p.2) 
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dashed hopes on an end to authoritarian rule, would have constituted a disservice 
to the role of law and the transition judiciary in a post-conflict dynamic. 
 
Breaking Away from Tradition 
 
A fundamental issue in the PDP Case is the nature of the rights of the 2nd 
plaintiff, Bonnie Haruna, Atiku’s elected running mate for Deputy-Governor. The 
law in question, the State Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional 
Provisions) Decree, even as the title suggests, was constitutive of the transitional 
arrangements going on in the country at the time, particularly with respect to 
elections. While conceding the constitutional nature of the legislation, the 
Respondents argued that the law was intended to provide a framework for 
governance of the country in the transition period and not to create individual 
rights.  
 In rejecting the contention, the Court held that constitutional legislation 
establishes rights that the courts must be ‘creative’ to protect and uphold. This 
approach led the majority to hold that where the Governor-elect abdicates, 
abandons or relinquishes his mandate, the Deputy Governor-elect (though elected 
on a joint ticket) does not thereby forfeit his right to the latter position. This was 
so because they had each acquired individualised rights by their election, the one 
to be governor and the other, deputy governor.92 The right so conferred was of a 
public nature and did not inure to the benefit of an individual who was not 
elected. Quite importantly, the Court noted that to hold to the contrary was not 
only ‘fallacious but dangerous to the democratic process.’93 I share this concern. 
Regrettably, as earlier noted, the court failed to carry forward such a 
purposive approach in the subsequent Oputa Case particularly with regard to the 
rights of the victims of authoritarian rule. The judicial misdirection that set the 
stage for non-implementation of the Panel’s recommendations has been attended 
by dire consequences for transitional justice, social stability and economic 
development in Nigeria. The bedlam in the Niger Delta, where whole 
communities came forward with serious allegations of violations of human rights 
by the state and multinational corporations at the Oputa Panel but failed to obtain 
redress is but one cardinal indicator of this.  
 
The ICPC Case: Federalism v Commonweal 
 The foregoing purposive approach to judicial interpretation was also 
adopted by the Supreme Court in another epoch-making case in the transition 
                                                 
92 Ibid. at 50 
93 PDP Case note 77 supra per Ayoola JSC at 148. Emphasis mine. 
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period. This was in Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the 
Federation & 35Ors (the ICPC Case). 94   
 
From the Doldrums of Infamy 
 
At the dawn of the transition to civil rule, Nigeria had become a 
notoriously corrupt country, occupying the non-enviable position of second most 
corrupt nation in the world according to Transparency International’s corruption 
index.95 The country has been cited as ‘the crowning example of governmental 
corruption and betrayal of the hopes of the citizenry in Africa.’96 
Combating corruption in the polity was clearly a policy imperative for an 
incoming administration intent on halting the downward spiral in the nation’s 
economic and social development or even one determined to move the society 
towards the realisation of its full potentials. Then incoming-President Olusegun 
Obasanjo recognised the enormity of the problem of corruption in the country. In 
his inaugural address to the nation at his swearing-in, he expressed the 
determination of his administration to tackle corruption that he described as ‘a 
full-blown cancer’ and ‘the greatest single bane of our society.’97  
To underscore the administration’s commitment to combating the scourge 
of corruption as a major policy initiative, the anti-corruption law was the first 
executive bill submitted by the executive to the National Assembly (the federal 
legislature) for enactment. After stiff opposition from a considerable number of 
legislators, excision or tempering of some perceived ‘draconian’ provisions and 
public outrage at the obvious reluctance of the legislature to pass the bill into law, 
the National Assembly enacted the Corrupt and Other Related Offences Act No.5 
of 2000 several months later.98 
The explanatory memorandum at the end of the law states its purpose as 
the prohibition and prescription of punishment for corrupt practices and other 
related offences. In addition, it established the Independent Corrupt Practices 
                                                 
94 (2002) 6 S.C. Pt I 
95 Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission Progress Report 2000- 
July 2005 (ICPC Abuja 2005) 2. Available at: http://www.icpc.gov.ng/history.php (1 September 
2007).  
96  Iheukwumere, Emmanuel O and Iheukwumere, Chukwuemeka A “Colonial Rapacity and 
Political Corruption: Roots of African Corruption and Misery” (2003) 3 Chicago-Kent Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 1, 46-60.  
97 Nigeria World “Inaugural Speech by His Excellency, President Olusegun Obasanjo following 
his Swearing-in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on May 29, 1999”. Available at: 
http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/speech/inaugural.htm 
98 In Nigeria’s federal legislative tradition, federal and state statutes are referred to as ‘Acts’ and 
‘Laws’ respectively. However, I use the term ‘law’ generically in this piece to refer to both forms 
of legislation except where clarity demands specificity.  
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Commission (ICPC, the Commission) to investigate and prosecute offenders. The 
powers of the ICPC extended to all individuals, public and private, including 
corporate bodies in the country. The all-encompassing reach of the ICPC Act was 
bound to attract jurisdictional challenge given the federal character of the 
Nigerian polity and the general discontent with previous practice of military 
regimes to disregard the dynamics of federalism in governance and law-making.  
The attempt by the Commission to prosecute an official of the Ondo State 
government set the stage for the inevitable challenge of the jurisdictional powers 
of the ICPC. 99 By virtue of section 232 of the 1999 constitution and in line with 
Nigerian constitutional practice, the Attorney–General of Ondo State on behalf of 
the state government headed for the Supreme Court. The section confers on the 
Supreme Court, original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other court, on any 
dispute between the federation and a state or between states inter se once the 
dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or 
extent of a legal right depends. This was one such case. 
He challenged he constitutionality of the ICPC Act by taking not just the 
Federal Government (protagonist of the legislation) to Court but also all the other 
35 states in the country for the obvious reason that the decision in the case would 
automatically affect their interests. The relief sought by the Plaintiff was double-
pronged. First, the Plaintiff sought an injunction of the Court to declare the law 
invalid on the ground that the law lacked jurisdictional validity for purporting to 
create a commission with powers to prosecute public and private individuals for 
offences within the states and in state high courts.100 Secondly, and of even more 
significance, it sought a perpetual injunction to restrain the ICPC and the Federal 
Attorney-General from exercising or applying any of the provisions of the law in 
Ondo State. In effect, the law would thereby be invalidated as a whole. Counsel to 
the Plaintiff canvassed precisely that in concluding his address to the Court.101  
The case for the Plaintiff (and some of the Defendants other than the 1st 
Defendant) was basically that no express or even implied provisions in the 
Constitution confer powers on the National Assembly to create a monolithic body 
with such an all-encompassing reach as the ICPC or the offences (of corruption) 
for which it was empowered to prosecute for the whole country. It was urged on 
the Court that the omission of a ‘general power to create and punish offences’ in 
the ‘scheme of enumeration’ (Legislative Lists) in the Constitution as referred to 
                                                 
99 In Nigeria, like other federal systems, there are federal (central), states and local authorities’ 
officials. ‘State official’ here refers to the narrower context of an official of a state government 
(constituent part) as against a ‘federal’ or ‘local authority’ in Nigeria’s 36-state federation. 
100  In line with common practice in federal political systems, state and federal offences are 
prosecuted in the state and federal courts respectively. 
101 ICPC Case note 94 supra at 10-13. 
28
Global Jurist, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 3 (Advances), Art. 4
http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol7/iss3/art4
above precluded the National Assembly from enacting the ICPC Act .102 Thus the 
anti-corruption law and a fortiori the ICPC, were ultra vires the National 
Assembly as ‘corruption’ is a residual matter within the exclusive legislative 
competence of the state governments. It is pertinent to note the similarity of this 
argument with that proffered by the Plaintiffs in the (earlier) Oputa Panel case on 
the powers of the president to establish a truth commission for the whole 
country.103 I will return to a juxtaposition of the two cases later.  
Less than half of the states, sixteen, filed briefs of argument in the matter. 
Not surprisingly, they were evenly split (8 each) in their support for or opposition 
to the case for the Plaintiff. While thirteen completely abstained, counsels 
represented 6 at the hearing but were precluded from arguing a position due to 
procedural requirements that only parties who had filed a brief could canvass oral 
arguments before the Court.  
At the core of the case for the 1st Defendant (the Federal Government) is 
the argument that the National Assembly was vested with the power to enact the 
ICPC Act pursuant to its constitutional powers to make laws for the ‘peace, order 
and good government of the Federation.’ The 1st Defendant conceded that the 
Exclusive Legislative List does not refer expressly to ‘corruption.’ It however 
argued that the National Assembly is constitutionally vested with the power to 
legislate as it did on corruption by a joint reading of several provisions of the 
Constitution. These include in particular the provisions of item 68 of the 
Exclusive List which provides that the National Assembly is empowered to 
legislate on ‘Any matter incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned 
elsewhere in this list.’ 
The 1st Defendant further anchored its argument on a joint construction of 
sections 15 (5), 88 (2) (a) and (b) as well as paragraph 2 of Part III and item 60 (a) 
of the Constitution. Item 60 (a) relied upon by the Federal Government provides 
that the National Assembly has the power to establish and regulate authorities ‘for 
the Federation or any part thereof’ in order ‘To promote and enforce the 
observance of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles’ contained in 
the Constitution. Section 15 (5) of the constitution tersely provides that ‘The State 
shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power.’ Finally, section 88 (2) (a) 
(b) of the constitution provides that the National Assembly shall have the power 
to ‘expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the administration of laws within 
its legislative competence.’  
The Court sanctioned the legality of the ICPC Act. It noted that in view of 
section 4 (2) of the Constitution which provides that the National Assembly has 
the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
                                                 
102 Ibid. at 44. 
103 Incidentally, the same counsel for the Plaintiffs (Generals) in the Oputa Case note 5 supra 
proffered it.  
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Federation with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List, it 
was intra vires the National Assembly to enact the ICPC Act under Item 60 (a) of 
the Constitution as canvassed by the 1st Defendant. Uwais CJN stated that the 
‘Fundamental Objectives and Directives of State Policy’ can only be enforced by 
legislation. He dismissed the argument that the anti-corruption law ought to be 
limited to public officers and the three arms of government alone since it forms 
part of the ‘Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy.’ In 
identifying with the social realities of the country in relation to the challenge 
posed by corrupt and related practices, he declared that since 
 
Corruption is not a disease which afflicts public officers alone…If it is to be 
eradicated effectively, the solution to it must be pervasive to cover every 
segment of the society [...].104  
 
‘Policy United’ All the Way 
 
Clearly, as noted by Professor Ben Nwabueze, one of the amici curiae, the 
task of the Court in the case was ‘challenging because the issue impinges on the 
cardinal principles of Nigeria’s federal system.’105 The ICPC Act in the view of 
the respected jurist was ‘subversive’ of the principles of federalism as enshrined 
in the Nigerian constitution and in violation of its constitutive doctrines of 
autonomy and non-interference.106 The confluence of constitutionalism and a key-
policy issue in a transitional context was bound to test the jurisprudence of the 
Court with resonance for the polity. 
The special significance of the case was not lost on the Court. In a clearly 
uncharacteristic move (at least in recent memory), it invited three distinguished 
legal practitioners as amici curiae to address the Court on the case. All three filed 
separate (advisory) briefs of argument with two arguing against the legality and 
the third in support of the ICPC Act.107 In an unbridled positivistic approach to the 
role of law in society, a highly regarded constitutional law jurist and retired 
Professor of Law, Benjamin Nwabueze, argued that the country was better placed 
to deal with corruption to which it had become accustomed than for the Court to 
uphold a legislation that tampers with the federal structure of the country and 
could lead to ‘grave political danger.’108 The Court titled the balance in favour of 
actively working against corruption, viewing it as the more dangerous 
phenomenon in the polity. 
                                                 
104 ICPC Case note 94 supra at 28. 
105 Ibid. at 17. 
106 Ibid. at 18-19. 
107 Ibid. at 91. 
108 ICPC Case note 94 supra at 94. 
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It is germane to an understanding of the case to note that there is an 
allocation of legislative powers between the two tiers of government in the second 
schedule to the Constitution. The ‘Exclusive Legislative List’ itemises the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal (central) government while the ‘Concurrent 
Legislative List’ specifies the shared sphere of legislative powers between the two 
tiers. An unwritten Residual Legislative List is deemed in Nigerian constitutional 
practice to be the exclusive province of respective state governments on unlisted 
matters.  
The learned Chief Justice displayed a utilitarian conception of the function 
of law to buttress his jurisprudential preference to sacrifice formalism (which 
could have accorded better recognition to the federal status of the country) at the 
altar of the (transitional) exigencies of the times when he further observed that 
‘the aim of making law is to achieve the common good.’109 He took the view that 
‘state’ in section 15 (5) applied to both the Federal and State levels of government 
in the country, and thus the power to legislate on corruption could be regarded as 
concurrent. 
The point ought to be made however, that on a literal construction of the 
foregoing provisions and others in the Nigerian constitution, the Plaintiff and 
most of the Defendants who adopted the position, brief and argument of the 
former, were on quite firm grounds. To buttress this position, the Court did find 
some merit in the case for the Plaintiff and the case for the latter succeeded in part 
even if minimally, in respect of certain provisions which it sought to be declared 
ultra vires the ICPC. Incidentally, these were only aspects of the law the Court 
adjudged impugned on the judicial powers and independence of the courts. The 
court applied the blue pencil rule to strike down those sections.110 
For good measure, it is noteworthy there are no specific provisions in the 
itemised list of legislative competencies in the Nigerian constitution conferring 
power on the National Assembly to enact law and establish a monolith anti-
corruption agency for the whole country, desirable as this may be. The Court only 
came to such a decision by applying a liberal interpretation and imputing an 
implied existence of such powers 
 
Reading these provisions of the 1999 constitution together and construed 
liberally and broadly, it can be easily seen that the National Assembly possesses 
the power both “incidental” and “implied” to promulgate the Corrupt and Other 
Related Offences Act, 2000 to enable the State which for this purpose means the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, to implement the provision of Section 15(5) of the 
Constitution.111 
 
                                                 
109 Ibid at 29. 
110 Ibid. at 32-33. Sections 26(5) and 35 are implicated in this.  
111 Ibid. at 35 per Wali JSC. 
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It is germane to note here that the Court addressed the tension between the 
policy choice to combat corruption through a monolith institution like the ICPC in 
pursuance of a holistic approach and the fundamental principle of federalism itself 
clearly enshrined in the constitution. Uwais C.J.N conceded the possible 
infringement of the ‘requirement of autonomy of the State government and non-
interference with the functions of State government (sic).’ But he was quick to 
observe that such interference has constitutional support.  
The learned Chief Justice waived the ‘cardinal principles’ aside as ‘best 
ideals to follow or guidance for an ideal situation’112 again demonstrating the 
recognition of the transitional circumstances of the country and the policy 
considerations involved in the Court’s position on the matter. Ogwuegbu JSC was 
even more candid in his admission of the possibility of interference and a 
compromise concerning the doctrine of autonomy at the core of federalism the 
unanimous decision constituted. He readily sacrificed the latter for what he and 
other members of the Constitutional Panel of the Court considered to be the 
overriding priority to ‘make laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
Federation.’ He was of the view that corruption constituted a threat to all of these 
to and the ICPC Act was designed to combat the threat. In what can be regarded 
as poignant reflection of the letter and spirit of the judgement, he affirmed that 
 
The Court is conscious of the history of corruption in Nigeria and should not be 
at liberty to construe the ICPC Act or any Act …by the motives which 
influenced the Legislature, yet when the history of the law and legislation tells 
the court what the policy and object of the Legislature were, the court is to see 
whether the terms of the Act are such as fairly carry out the policy and 
objective…Any legislation on corruption must be of concern to every 
Nigerian.113 
 
The Court was thus acutely aware of the political nature of its decision. 
The remarkable identification of the Court with the aspirations of the society and 
its preference for a purposive jurisprudential approach constituted unparalleled 
exceptionalism in the history of judicial constitutionalism in Nigeria.  
 
 
4. VALIDITY OF PURPOSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN 
NIGERIA’S TRANSITION 
 
Barak posits that the purposive judicial interpretational approach is the ‘proper 
system of interpretation’ of the constitution and statutes alike in democratic 
                                                 
112 ICPC Case note 94 supra at 30.  
113 ICPC Case note 94 supra at 59 to 61. Emphasis mine. 
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societies.114 If we agree with this postulation then the purposive interpretive 
approach is even more apposite for adjudication in transitional contexts where 
immense national and international resources are usually deployed to effect 
institutional transformation and restoration of the rule of law.  
 
Displacing Positivism in Transitional Contexts 
 
A comprehensive reading of the judgements delivered by each of the six 
justices in their concurrence with the lead judgement in the ICPC Case reveals a 
purposive jurisprudence that identified with the peculiar historicity of corruption 
in the country. Thus the Court waxed quite strong on casting its lot with policy 
measures regarding one of the salient programmes stated in the inaugural address 
of then incoming President Olusegun Obasanjo. In this regard, Uwaifo JSC 
declared in his judgement  
 
The issue of corruption and abuse of power has become international. It is a 
declared state policy in Nigeria to combat it and so it has assumed a national 
issue of high priority which is considered best suited for the National Assembly 
to be addressed through a federal agency like the ICPC.115 
 
Similar advertence to the foregoing principles and the ‘peace, order and 
good government’ provisions adopted by the Court in the ICPC Case would have 
served equally well to save the Oputa Panel Case from being determined along so 
narrow lines as did the Court on that occasion. The Court in coming to the 
decision to uphold the ICPC Act clearly made a policy decision to reject the black 
letter of the law. Positivists (especially) may strongly deprecate such an approach 
in normal situations as fostering uncertainty in the law. But that is precisely the 
point that the Court missed in the Oputa Panel Case. Transition contexts are not 
normal contexts. While certainty in the law requires the judiciary to be consistent, 
consistency in transitional societies ought to be in full awareness of and attuned to 
the social context.  
Teitel’s contention that in transitional contexts, positivism of law is 
dependent on the ‘popular perception in the public sphere,’116 is apt to the 
Nigerian situation. Thus the adoption of a liberal purposive approach as 
demonstrated by the Supreme Court to the social realities of the country in its 
attempt to break with the past it is argued, is to be preferred to the plain-fact or 
literal approach that may be the appropriate course in the absence of social 
contingencies challenging the very foundations of societies in political transition. 
This is what Teitel considers as the ‘social construction of the law’; one of the 
                                                 
114 Barak note 11 supra at 26. 66-82. 
115 Ibid at 116. 
116 Teitel note 21 supra at 2027. 
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paradigmatic shifts from conventional understandings of the rule of law relevant 
to conceptions of law in transitions.117  
In the pre-transition period, Nigerian society had been victim of economic 
and financial rape leading to monumental social deprivations perpetrated by the 
largely predatory ruling elite. The deplorable situation was occasioned partly by 
weak legislation and law enforcement arrangements as well as a corrupt and 
compromised judiciary. Bell et al, much like Teitel, argues that law as well as 
legal institutions suffer degradation in conflict (and repressive) situations that 
impair their legitimacy. Thus, both the law and legal institutions must facilitate as 
well as be changed themselves.118 Perhaps in realisation of this the Court opted 
here for a ‘constructivist,’119 transformative model of adjudication and actively led 
the way in support of the expressed popular desire for checkmating past injustices 
and continuing similar injustices. 120  The concluding remarks of Ogwuegbu JSC 
convey the attitude of the Court in the case. At the risk of descending into the 
adversarial arena, he candidly voiced what is no doubt popular opinion on the 
matter in the Nigerian society 
 
I must also point out that all Nigerians except perhaps those who benefit from it 
are unhappy with the level of corruption in the country. The main opposition to 
the ICPC Act is I believe, borne out of fear and suspicion.121  
 
Deepening the Rule of Law in Transitional Contexts 
 
There is also the sense in which the decision in the ICPC Case 
significantly deepens the rule of law in the country. This is in the way it has 
strengthened the hands of prosecutors who are reassured that no one will be above 
the law in the fight against corruption. The decision signals clearly that it would 
not be ‘business as usual’ for corrupt public and private actors who had held the 
country hostage and taken it to ‘the nadir of the miasma of corrupt practices.’122 
Recently, the chief prosecutor and highest ranking law officer in the country, the 
Attorney-General of the Federation after coming under strident public criticism 
for his perceived toleration of corruption by public officers declared an all out war 
on corruption. He vowed to ensure the prosecution of all established cases of 
corruption by public officers in the post-transition period till date. The 
prosecution would leave no sacred cows, as ‘governors, ministers and any other 
                                                 
117 Ibid. at 2027. 
118 Christine, Bell et al. Justice Discourses in Transition” Social & Legal Studies 13 (3) (2004) 
305, 309. 
119 Ibid. at 2014 
120 Joseph, Richard. “Africa: States in Crisis” Journal of Democracy 14 (3) (2003): 159, 167. 
121 ICPC Case note 94 supra Ibid at 67. 
122 ICPC Case  note 94 supra at 133 per Uwaifo JSC 
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government official mentioned in those reports would be prosecuted.’ 123 In this 
regard it is noteworthy that recent research on public perceptions of institutional 
performance and legitimacy in the democratic transition in Nigeria indicates a 
‘growing approval for anti-corruption efforts.’124  
The role of the judiciary in adopting a purposive approach to salient 
foundational issues in the anti-corruption project, with its notable impact on the 
rule of law, cannot be divorced from such perceptions. This is particularly so 
granted that clamours for transparency in the management of public funds on the 
one hand, and prosecution of erring corrupt public office-holders on the other, 
have assumed centre-stage in the criminal justice administration system in the 
country in recent times than ever before.125 A clear manifestation of the situation 
is the tremendous support (including again, judicial) for the establishment and 
activities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), despite the 
clear overlap in the functions and powers of the two and the elaborate structural 
arrangements that have been made for their effective operations.  
Teitel has stated that the judiciary more than any other arm of government 
is better situated to facilitate change in transitional societies.126 In the event there 
appears to be substantial political will in the other arms of government to design a 
policy to effect radical change, it would be counterintuitive for the judiciary to 
frustrate such policy initiatives. Mass public support for an anti-corruption policy 
in the Nigerian context is better appreciated against the background of the fact 
that the statute books have for decades provided some of the severest punishments 
(including death sentence in some cases) for property crimes like robbery, 
stealing, arson and related offences generally considered crimes within the 
province of underprivileged felons. The anti-corruption drive with its seeming 
emphasis on ‘grand’ (as against ‘petty’) corruption127 was viewed as more 
inclusive if not specifically targeted at the criminally-minded members of the 
upper strata of the society. 
The decision of the Court in the ICPC Case constitutes a defining moment, 
a watershed in the country’s nascent anti-corruption policy. The enormity of the 
corruption scourge in the country is highlighted by the fact that the ICPC is 
finalising prosecutorial arrangements on more than 20 former state governors 
                                                 
123 Aboyade, Funke “Aondoakaa to Prosecute Persons Indicted by National Assembly” This Day 
Online (Abuja Saturday 20 October 2007). 
124 Lewis note 91 supra at 8. 
125 Ojo, Olakunle and Abubakar Mustapha “CLO, TMG Want EFCC, Conduct Bureau to Try 
Etteh” The Guardian Online Edition (Lagos Saturday 29 September 2007). Available 
http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/news/article05 
126 Teitel note 21 supra at 2033 
127 Uslaner Eric “Corruption and the Inequality Trap in Africa” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 
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barely 4 months after they left office and lost executive immunity from 
prosecution for official corruption and abuse of office.128 At least one of the 
former governors has been convicted for money laundering and corrupt 
enrichment following his impeachment and four others are currently on trial on 
similar charges. 
The Court made a remarkable break with the past in the ICPC Case 
moving tangentially along some of the very lines it was to reject later in part or 
whole in the Oputa case. One of the most obvious in this regard is the readiness of 
the court to accord a prominent place to policy considerations particularly in the 
context of transition. This attitude was prominent not only in the lead judgement 
but ran through all the separate concurring decisions in the ICPC Case. There is 
also of course the unanimity of the 7 wise men. It is significant that the issue of 
‘policy’ consideration was cited in the latter decision with unanimous approbation 
and expressed in the lead judgement rather than in reprobation and dissent that 
characterised it in the PDP Case. Recall that Ogundare JSC raised this point in 
condemnation of the majority decision in the PDP Case. He had stated that 
 
It is not for the Court to determine what the legislature meant to say but what it 
actually said. Nor is the court to read something into such provisions on the 
grounds of policy129 
 
no doubt in obvious disregard of the dynamic role of law and the judiciary in 
transition. In implicit disavowal of its long-standing formalist jurisprudential 
approach, the Court did not refer to any of its earlier decisions that relied so 
heavily on ‘policy considerations.’ The Court indeed closed its eyes to positivist 
adjurations to keep the flow of the waters of law and politics pure and separate. 
 
     Beyond Provincialism 
 
Equally significant was the willingness of the Court to engage in a 
comparative juridical approach in its judgement in the ICPC Case. It analysed 
with approval, many foreign cases from other federal jurisdictions bearing on 
transition, emergency, and more generally, cases with significant implications on 
national life. It had hitherto demonstrated a judicial proclivity for ignoring even 
relevant international law obligations of the country in the context of the 
transition as with the Oputa Case.  
Thus, a good deal of the rationes decidendi in the ICPC Case was rooted 
in foreign precedents specifically from federal jurisdictions like the United States, 
                                                 
128 See F Oretade “ICPC to Speed up Ex-Governors’ Trials” ICPC News (Monday 3 September 
2007) Available at: http://www.icpc.gov.ng/read_news.php?id=61 (3 September 2007) and F 
Igwuoke “Speakers Back Ex-Govs’ Trials” This Day (Abuja Sunday 22 July 2007). 
129 PDP Case note 77 supra at 91. 
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Canada and Australia. This marked a departure from an established tradition of 
insularity in which otherwise relevant foreign decisions were considered by the 
courts with suspicion and declared inapplicable in the country. It is significant to 
the extent that failure to benefit from and accord recognition to such decisions 
delivered in similar contemporary socio-political contexts (like the South Africa 
transitional experience) hampered the development of a robust human rights 
jurisprudence and culture in the country. Advertence to comparative law 
constitutes one of the tools to achieve an effective discharge of the duties of 
judges in a democracy, particularly in the context of an increasingly globalized 
world.130 In the converse then, neglect of comparative perspectives may deny 
national courts of potentially perspicacious jurisprudential insights. 
 
Peace, Order and Good Governance to the Rescue 
 
Another striking feature of the decision in the ICPC Case is the heavy 
store (rightly) placed by the Supreme Court on the constitutional provision that 
the National Assembly had the power to legislate for the ‘peace, order and good 
government’ of every part of the federation. As I argued earlier, rejection of this 
provision by the Court in the Oputa Case constitutes a fundamental misdirection 
regarding the role of law in the context of transition. Granted that the shaky legal 
arrangements of the Oputa Panel made the intentions of the executive less 
credible at best, it would have better served the purpose of the rule of law and 
justice to victims of impunity to uphold the process than to chip away the basis of 
its legal validity through unrepentant and rigid plain-fact jurisprudence.  
The foregoing argument is reinforced by the fact that the TIA, which was 
in issue in the Oputa Panel case, started its life and was so upheld by the Court as 
a valid Act passed by the National Assembly. It thus shared a critical element 
with the ICPC Act; it is meant to ensure the ‘peace, order and good government’ 
of every part of the federation without precluding state governments from 
enacting similar legislation. In any event, the purpose it was deplored to serve in 
the establishment of the Oputa Panel was clearly for that. That the Court ought to 
have followed this purposive approach is underlined further by the fact that it 
appeared to have laid firm foundation for transition jurisprudence in the majority 
decision in the relatively earlier PDP Case. This it did in spite of the unsuccessful 
attempt to retain it on the well-worn tracks of plain-fact jurisprudence. But the 
Supreme Court failed when it upheld the jurisdictional argument against the 
Oputa Panel on the basis that the legislative lists do not mention ‘Commission of 
Inquiry’ or ‘Tribunal of Inquiry’ in the 1999 Constitution and thus held that it is 
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thus a matter for the unwritten Residual List ostensibly within the exclusive ambit 
of the states. 
 
5. DISCORDANT TUNES 
 
One of the important functions of judges in their interpretive role is the creation 
and sustenance of ‘normative harmony.’ This ensures individual statutes are 
creatively interpreted as part of an integrated legal system.131 Failure of the 
judiciary, especially at the highest levels, to foster an integrated and consistent 
approach to the interpretive role, particularly in the context of transition tends to 
jeopardise the critical role outlined for the transition judiciary by Teitel. The 
judiciary would then be failing in its role of ‘bridging the gap… between law and 
society.’132 
It is pertinent to determine further whether the judiciary, faced with the 
challenging dynamics of law and justice in the context of transition, has itself 
become transformed, the accountability gap notwithstanding. It is possible to 
come to a positive conclusion at first blush. Scrutiny however suggests 
differently. The jurisprudence emanating from the Nigerian judiciary in the post-
military authoritarian period from the vertical and horizontal levels appears to be 
discordant at best. 
  
Ambivalence or New Directions 
 
It would appear that an ambivalent disposition continues to characterise 
the decisions of the Court. This view of the matter could of course be challenged 
particularly in view of recent acclaim offered in connection with a number of 
transition-related decisions delivered by the judiciary, the Supreme Court in 
particular. They centre on constitutional issues generated from a rash of election 
related cases in the heated political scene in the country. Commentators have been 
described some of them as ‘landmark’ decisions.133 The judiciary has even 
received plaudits from usually critical quarters.134 In addition, public opinion 
surveys focusing on election petition tribunals, which adjudicate the highly 
                                                 
131 Barak note 11 supra at 35. 
132 Ibid.  
133 See for instance Akiri Chris. “Obi: Advantages of the Supreme Court Ruling” The Guardian 
(Lagos Wednesday 27 June 2007). See also Brown, Makinde. “Election Petitions and the 
Judiciary” The Guardian Online Edition (Lagos Friday 1 June 2007)1-3, and Njoku, Lawrence 
“Appeal Court Reinstates Obi- Factional Lawmakers File Stay of Execution of Judgment” The 
Guardian Online Edition (Lagos Sunday 11 February 2007) 1-4.  
134 See for instance Iriekpen, Daniel. “Agbakoba, Falana Commend S’Court” This Day Online 
Edition (Abuja Friday 15 June 2007).  
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controversial ‘civilian-civilian’ election transition cases in the country, also 
suggest the judiciary has been the most ‘consistent’ branch of government in the 
transition period.135 Others have described the judiciary as ‘the hero of Nigeria’s 
democracy.’136 
In view of these examples therefore, ought not the Nigerian transition 
judiciary to be commended for overcoming its previous questionable record of 
judicial governance? Commendable as the above appraisals may be, however, 
they constitute no more than flashes in the pan of the situational circumstance of 
judicial activity in the country. In this regard, it is important to consider the 
temporality of the foregoing decisions and other contemporary transition cases 
and the trends they reflect. Consider that the Court in its decision in the Oputa 
Panel Case that was decided more than three years after the PDP Case,137 seemed 
to have still been caught up in its old plain-fact jurisprudential approach despite 
the purposive approach signposted by the majority decision in the latter. It bears 
repetition furthermore, that a seven-man constitutional panel unanimously 
decided the Oputa Panel Case in defiance of international law obligations of the 
country to victims of gross violations of human rights. The relapse violently 
displaced the purposive approach advocated by the constitutional panel of the 
Court in the PDP Case.  
The Oputa Panel Case clouded even the commendable purposive approach 
of the ICPC Case decided on 7th June 2002 and despite their 
contemporaneousness, there was no reference in any one to the other at all levels 
of the courts involved. The failure of cross-citation reflects a lack of coherence in 
the jurisprudential outlook of the Supreme Court. In a common law based legal 
system where precedent is at the nerve-centre of judicial-decision making, such 
lack of clear judicial direction necessarily impacts on the lower courts.  
Again it is germane to recall that the purposive decision in the PDP Case 
was itself seriously threatened at the time and was only achieved at the closest 
possible split of 4/3. This was despite the obvious threat to the rule of law a 
counter decision posed in the prevalent fragile political environment of a non-
negotiated transition. It is important to note too that none of the cases made any 
explicit reference to the transitional status of the Nigerian society, momentous as 
                                                 
135 Shobiye, Hameed. “Poll Applauds Kogi Election Tribunal” Punch On the Web (Lagos 24  
October). Available at:  
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this was in all three cases in particular and the socio-political circumstances of the 
time. All of these suggest the absence of a coherent purposive jurisprudential 
approach that behoves a transitional judiciary.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The need for all institutions of governance to participate in obtaining redress for 
human rights violations in post conflict societies is underscored by the necessity 
of a process of accountability to serve as the foundation for establishing the rule 
of law in such societies.138 The judiciary considering its usually privileged 
stability in the face of political upheaval must be at the forefront of 
institutionalising the rule of law particularly in post transitional contexts.  
The enunciation of a radical, transformative jurisprudence by the judiciary 
holds considerable promise for the restoration of the rule of law and at the 
institutional level, signals a definitive break from the past.139 Such judicial 
disposition is particularly important in transition societies where the executive and 
legislature in the new democratic dispensation may owe avowed loyalty to or are 
actual protégés of the former illiberal regime, thus at the risk of potentially 
derogating from the quantum of real representation of the common interest. 
The judiciary in societies in transition cannot remain aloof of the realities 
of the operating environment even if only for the pragmatic necessity to maintain 
its relevance in society. It has a critical role to play in mediating conflict and 
upholding human rights through a robust interpretation of law. This is particularly 
so in societies like Nigeria, where the judiciary has been previously implicated in 
validating authoritarian rule and thus undermining the rule of law. An activist 
stance will enable the judiciary to earn credibility, promote justice, foster peace 
and contribute to societal recovery and development. Such a proactive role is of 
particular relevance in developing and transitional societies where the judiciary 
had been noted for ‘usurper friendly’ jurisprudence.140 
 In the performance of its adjudicatory role in the Oputa Panel Case, the 
Nigerian judiciary opted for a conservative approach to the issues at stake in the 
emergent contestations. The judiciary not only failed to engage with the 
established international human rights standards on the right to truth and remedy 
for victims of gross human rights violations, but also the dynamics of a society in 
transition. This left the truth in jeopardy and victims in despair. 
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In post-authoritarian societies, the public expect much of the judiciary. 
Such demanding expectations derive partly from the fact that it has the longest 
history of functional institutional stability compared to the executive and 
legislative branches of government, since both are invariably trumped by military 
political-adventurism and authoritarian rule. Ironically, the judiciary, typically 
steeped in well-worn traditions and customarily exempt from popular public 
accountability mechanisms, deployed in transitional societies may be slow or 
even unwilling to take on headlong the challenges of social transformation. It may 
be ill prepared or even oblivious of these great expectations and its important role 
in the transitioning polity.  
However, the discussion in this article on judicial constitutionalism in 
Nigeria’s political transition suggests that a combination of public-driven factors 
may significantly impact the state of judicial inertia in transitions. Such factors 
may reconfigure judicial synergy, redirecting the judiciary to the realisation that it 
cannot but move with the socio-political realities of the times. It will thus be 
primed to join the front seat in taking on a proactive role in governance and 
moving the transitioning state forward as evinced in the ICPC and PDP decisions. 
How well it proceeds on the path that takes forward this purposive approach is 
dependent on its ability to make a distinct break with a past tainted by complicit 
jurisprudence. 
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